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Paper Title: Rethinking Radical Democracy 
Abstract
Over the course of three decades, vocabularies of radical democracy have 
pressed their stamp on democratic thought. Trading on the intuition that there 
is more to democracy than elections, they have generated critical insights into 
the important role that practices of pluralisation and critique play in bettering 
institutional politics. As a result, few would today deny the radical democratic 
contribution to democratic thought. What many might question, however, is its 
continuing traction. The paper probes this question, focusing on the nuanced 
place of democracy in contemporary radical work. It grapples with the 
difficulties that this poses for radical democrats and it suggests that a way of 
overcoming these difficulties – that threaten to undermine the coherence of 
radical democracy – is to rethink and reconstruct the distinctiveness of its 
vocabulary. The paper attempts such a reconstruction. It develops the idea of 
the promissory rule of the many and it discusses the ways it rejuvenates 
broader democratic thought.
Keywords: promise, democracy, many, people, popular rule, radical 
1Rethinking Radical Democracy
Introduction
There is a consensus in the literature that radical democracy designates a 
distinctive area of contemporary political thought. Set apart by a twin focus on 
ontology and transformative politics, it foregrounds the manifold ways in which 
democratic life might be pluralised, energised and reworked. This reworking 
takes, to be sure, many forms. As the reader familiar with the literature knows, 
there are many trajectories of radical democracy divided by theoretico-political 
differences over the type of transformative politics to be aimed for. Despite 
these differences, however, it has been argued that the pronounced concern 
with alternatives to the current socio-political order – that is, with possibilities 
of thinking and acting otherwise – constitutes the common thread among the 
trajectories of radical democratic thought (Thomassen, 2005, p.116). 
The present paper uses this argument as its point of departure. It focuses on 
democracy – the vector of transformative politics for radical democrats – and 
it explores the challenges that this gives rise to for radical thought. It suggests 
that if democracy (practices of openness and participation) no longer emerges 
as a vehicle for transformation for radical democrats, as the first section 
shows, then the distinctive contribution of radical democracy to broader 
democratic thought becomes undermined. But the reverse is also true. When 
the institutions of contemporary – liberal and institutional – democracy 
constitute the only vector for radicalisation, then confidence in the 
transformative politics that radical democrats promise wanes. The paper 
grapples with this question and the rethink of radical democracy it provokes. 
What is of particular interest in this rethink is the intellectual coherence of 
radical democracy – the contours of its various renditions and the way they 
might be construed to contribute to democratic theory. This, on the one hand, 
works to limit the analysis, focusing upon the work of those theories that, 
inspired by post-structuralism, rework radicalism alongside democracy; 
however, on the other hand, this same concern inflates the analysis, forcing 
2the extrapolation and anticipation of themes that speak to various theories 
without putting any one of these theories to a systematic treatment. It is the 
articulation of these two aspects that I propose is incisive for democratic 
theory. The benefit that comes with this approach is that it allows the 
reconstruction of radical democracy in a way that recasts anew its contribution 
to democratic theory.  
Two main arguments emerge from this reconstruction. The first is that radical 
theories find in the notion of the many – and, effectively, in the promissory 
politics of its rule – an unlikely, yet underexplored, common denominator. This 
argument departs from the assumption, prominent in the literature, that the 
ontological turn in contemporary thought is what distinguishes and determines 
the agenda(s) for radical democracy (Tønder and Thomassen, 2005). It 
proposes that something more than ontology constitutes a distinctive feature 
of radical democratic thought. The argument also departs from the priority that 
the literature gives to political subjectification. It proposes that the subject that 
subjectifies has a recognisable name: the many. 
The second argument that the paper develops is closely related. It suggests 
that there are advantages to this reconstruction of radical democracy around 
the promissory politics of the many. If we consider that the main challenge 
confronting contemporary democracies concerns popular discontent with 
governing elites and the rejection of all politics styled as normal, then we 
notice that radical theories tap into this discontent. First, they are astutely 
attuned to the uneasiness surrounding the neoliberal politics of institutional 
democracies; second, they anticipate the ensuing loss of popular affect for 
democracy. In so doing, theories of radical democracy yield critical insights 
into the ways in which contemporary democracies might be regenerated – 
that it is possible to miss if we evade the need to rethink and reconstruct 
radical democracy. The last section of the paper explores these insights and it 
outlines the benefits they bring to a democratic theory that underplays the 
ways in which promissory politics nurtures democratic attachments. Before 
this, the next section sets out the grounds for rethinking radical democracy.  
31. Democracy in Radical Thought 
The aim of this section is to explain why there is a need to rethink radical 
democracy. It suggests that divisions about the usefulness of democracy as a 
vector of transformative politics threaten to undermine the intellectual 
coherence of radical democracy. They also significantly challenge its 
distinctiveness as a third debate in contemporary democratic theory. 
To grasp the seriousness of these challenges, one needs to begin by noting 
that the distinctiveness of radical democracy as a debate in democratic theory 
is inseparable from the account of democracy it offers as an open-ended 
process (Tønder and Thomassen, 2005) . This account is, to be sure, 
influenced by ontological reflection.1 As the literature rightly explains, 
reflection on being reveals the contingent and contested nature of democratic 
foundations (Kioupkiolis, 2011; Marchart, 2007)  But such reflection does 
more than this. It gives centre stage to bottom-up participation as the 
exemplary form of activism that contests closures and ensures openness (see 
Norval, 2001; Little and Lloyd, 2009; Trend, 1996; Kioupkiolis, 2011; Conway 
and Singh, 2011). When relations of exclusion become challenged and 
struggles for equality extend to ever new domains, socio-political practice 
radicalises and expands2 (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Chambers, 2004; 
McClure,1992). 
This kind of radicalisation through democracy – that is, through practices that 
stimulate participation and openness - is what I take to be distinctive of radical 
democracy as a debate in democratic theory. It is also what I use as the point 
of departure for reconstructing radical democracy in the ensuing sections. To 
grasp why this idea of radicalisation through democracy occupies centre 
stage in my discussion, it is worth reflecting further on its standing in radical 
thought. For a good part of the literature, democracy, as I have already 
defined it, functions as a signifier of more equal – inclusive and meaningful – 
relations. Even when this equality does not actualise (as it never does), it is 
assumed that more democracy – practices that, as we have seen, stimulate 
participation and openness – will incite change. Democracy thus transpires as 
4a vector of transformation for radical democrats in a way that is not always 
recognised (or questioned) in the literature. 
No doubt, the literature has paid much attention to the relation between 
democratic practice and institutions of representation (Tormey, 2015; 
Thomassen, 2007). It has also paid attention to vertical and horizontal modes 
of transformation (Prentoulis and Thomassen, 2013; Kioupkiolis, 2018; Hardt 
and Negri, 2017; Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis, 2014). But it has not 
sufficiently reflected on the ways that assumptions of radicalisation through 
democracy – this common article of faith among radical democrats - weave 
together and challenge radical democracy. It has, therefore, failed to register 
how gnawing doubts about such radicalisation threaten to unravel the 
intellectual coherence of radical democracy as a debate in democratic theory. 
They take aim at the distinctive contribution of radical democracy in 
democratic thought – namely, its particular reworking of democracy – and, in 
so doing, they raise questions that radical democrats have, to my mind, 
evaded for too long.3 
Prominent among these questions is the following: Are the categories of 
openness and participation – or, in other words, democratic practices that 
stimulate participation and openness – sufficient to radicalise socio-political 
life, if by radicalisation we understand practices of emptying? Practices of 
emptying is a term that I borrow from the work of Ernesto Laclau, who insists 
that the aim of radical democracy is to produce emptiness – and not just 
assume this as the structural condition of democracy (2005, p.171). Emptying 
is, in this sense, the kind of operation that inscribes radicalism in the account 
of democracy that one finds in radical thought. It is also the kind of operation 
that is increasingly being doubted across various lines of thought. Three sets 
of doubt are noteworthy. 
The first set brings attention to the context of capitalism and the ease with 
which it co-opts the categories of emptiness, openness, difference and 
multiplicity – the currency, in other words, of radical democracy. Bruno 
Bosteels’ work is a good case in point here, for he argues that as the capitalist 
5market promotes the same themes as that of radical democracy, these can 
only be used to describe capitalist forces (2011a, pp.63-64). At the same time, 
Bosteels argues that – when the issue is no longer the totalities of twentieth 
century totalitarianism, that radical democracy was originally conceived in 
opposition to – the emphasis on emptying hollows out all emancipatory 
potential (Bosteels, 2011b, pp.261-262).  
This critique must not be misunderstood. The categories of openness and 
difference are an invaluable resource for all progressive – and not just radical 
democratic – thought. But they are not the only available resource as the next 
section shows. They open the way for a reflection that cashes in on the 
possibilities that such categories hold for transformation – what I later capture 
with the idea of the promissory rule of the many – without, however, either 
undermining or exaggerating the critical value of democracy for radical 
democrats. This is what, in the final analysis, Bosteels’ critique brings to the 
fore, namely, the need to put the transformative potential of such democracy 
(practices of emptying and opening) under critical scrutiny.
Parts of the literature resist the need for such scrutiny. Laclau and Mouffe’s 
account of radical democracy exemplifies this position. On the back of the 
assumption that the democratic principles of liberty and equality serve as the 
horizon that enables social movements to create chains of equivalence that 
challenge relations of subordination in all areas of social relations; Laclau and 
Mouffe heavily invest in democracy as a vector for transformation (2001). 
Mouffe, more recently, insists further on such investment not because she 
underestimates the effects of capitalism on the category of democratic 
openness, or even the limits of the liberal hegemony over democracy, but 
because she suggests that, as a signifier, democracy is still relevant to the 
struggles of social movements (2018, pp.41-51). In underlying continuity, 
then, with the argument first developed in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 
Mouffe argues that another articulation between democracy and liberalism 
and, therefore, a better implementation of liberal democratic principles can 
yield a different –more socialist, more equal and more democratic – 
hegemony (2018, p.45). 
6It is at this point that the second set of doubts comes to the fore – as theories 
concerned with practices of radical democracy in the Global South forcefully 
question how transformative another articulation between liberalism and 
democracy might be. Janet Conway and Jakeet Singh refer to this body of 
work as ‘the alternative tradition of radical democracy rooted in practices of 
subaltern social movements’ (2011, p.689). For this burgeoning literature the 
problem is that the hegemonic signifier of democracy silences and disqualifies 
ways of doing politics in contexts other than that of liberal democracy. 
Therefore, it comes with little radical potential for societies that mobilise 
different traditions of knowledge. 
The perspectival or place-based epistemology4 that these alternative 
traditions of radical democracy employ brings into focus practices of 
reciprocity, inclusion and cooperation (Conway and Singh, 2011, p.702). In 
other words, it brings into focus the perspective – the suffering, the practices, 
the imaginaries – of the other, not just her being. This is where in the end the 
limits of democracy lie, for this second line of thinking: the transformation it 
promises does not go far enough if the aim is only to (re)produce emptiness 
within universals such as that of liberal democracy. Liberal democracy must 
first be displaced – and knowledges become accordingly delinked, as Walter 
Mignolo proposes (2000; 2009) – for democracy to ensure a meaningful 
transformation that embraces alternative knowledges and practices as 
democratic. After all, theorists and activists engaged in practices of subaltern 
social movements do not altogether dismiss democracy as a vector of 
transformation. They seek to redescribe or mobilise it as a ‘connector’ that 
juxtaposes liberal with alternative renditions of democracy as reciprocity, 
cooperation and inclusivity (Mignolo 2000, p.742; see also Tully, 2014). 
Such redescriptions and mobilisations, nonetheless, point toward a third line 
of critique. It can be explained as follows: if the transformative potential of 
democracy that holds together radical democracy as a debate in democratic 
theory always draws on some articulation with liberalism, then radical 
democracy might be, in the end, more of a consensus than a debate. 
Perhaps, it is the political project of one strand of the post-Marxist left? This is 
7the point that new theories of communism allude to. By new theories of 
communism I mean the recent body of work that seeks to revive communism 
as the most meaningful horizon for a radical politics that aims to foster 
equality, plurality and popular rule. While there are many strands of such work 
-  divided over what communism precisely designates (an idea or a political 
project5); how it is to be achieved (through vertical or horizontal forms of 
organisation) and how it relates to capitalism (as its inverse or outgrowth6); 
they all strongly agree that communism constitutes a radical emancipatory 
project that captures the ‘egalitarian possibility’ missing from contemporary 
democracy (Badiou, 2013, p.46; see also Žižek, 2011, pp.475, 477). 
The upshot of this argument is that democracy becomes stripped of all 
transformative potential – partly because it fails to actualise the equality that 
these theories use as their point of departure (Dean, 2012); partly because it 
becomes reduced to the majority procedure that helps the management of the 
common of communism (Hardt and Negri, 2017). What surfaces, therefore, 
here is that emptying, the sine qua non of radicalisation through democracy, is 
again not enough. Some actualisation of equality is necessary. Communism 
promises such actualisation, for it melds with the egalitarian possibility, and in 
so doing, it eschews the need for democracy. Or as Dean puts it: 
[Communism] designates the sovereignty of the people, and not the people as 
a whole or a unity but the people as the rest of us’ (2012, p.69). In the next 
section I will show how the concern with the people as the rest of us – 
common among radical democrats who stress the need for bottom-up 
struggles that extend democracy – offers one opening to reconstructing 
radical democracy in a way that does not abandon democracy. Here suffice to 
note that calls to divorce aspirations to transformation from democracy are 
becoming alarmingly popular among strands of the post-1968 left.
What is alarming about such calls is that they offer support to (what 
increasingly looks like) a consensus among political theorists that democracy 
– liberal, institutional, representative, radical – fails to deliver for the people it 
is supposed to serve. While suspicions of (liberal and institutional) democracy 
are not new among radical democrats, they take on new urgency in the 
8context of rising inequalities and an intensification of neoliberal politics. They 
tap into concerns about how best to challenge such a context and, in so 
doing, they offer an opportunity to reconstruct radical democracy in a way that 
makes apparent some of the benefits it brings to broader democratic thought. 
The underlying intention behind this reconstruction is to change the terms of 
the radical democratic kinship in a way that attends to the three worries about 
the transformative potential of democracy without however loosing sight either 
of the need to retain some references to democracy or to openness. The next 
section takes a first step to this reconstruction. It develops the idea of the 
promissory rule of the many and it shows how this helps to conceptually 
rejuvenate, and thus reassert, radical democracy.  
2. The Promissory Rule of the Many
The aim of this section is to look for another common denominator among 
radical democrats other than the idea of radicalisation through democracy – 
that as the previous section showed threatens to silence the distinctive voice 
of radical democrats within broader democratic thought. If radicalisation 
through democracy - processes of emptying through practices that stimulate 
openness and participation - is not enough to inspire transformation outside 
the context of twentieth century totalitarianism, the confines of liberal 
democracy and a spirit of confidence in socialist accounts of equality; then is it 
possible to rethink such radicalisation in a way that mobilises the insights that 
the categories of openness and participation yield while negotiating the limits 
of emptying?
The section addresses this question by introducing the concept of the many 
and canvassing the promissory dimension of their rule. It argues that this 
promissory dimension, latent in all theories of radical politics, lays the ground 
for widening the ambit of radical democracy. The crucial point to note here is 
that the ambit of radical democracy does not widen by forcing various 
renditions of democracy to fit into one straightjacket. Rather, the point is to 
show that the political alternative, which all radical theories offer, hovers 
around the particular idea of the many and the promissory politics of its rule. 
9Whether this is still a democratic politics remains at this stage an open 
question. I engage with this question in the next section. Here suffice to note 
that the category of the many captures the points of intersection among the 
various renditions of the political subject that one finds in radical theories7 
without privileging any one of them. It also bears the imprint of post-
structuralist deconstructions of the political subject (Bosteels, 2016, p.20) – 
eschewing the dangers of fixity, uniformity and closure that are hemmed in 
modernist accounts of the rights-bearing citizen of the state (McClure,1992). 
To grasp, then, the specificity of the category of the many, it is worth 
contrasting my own account with those renditions of the many that 
immediately spring to the mind of the informed reader. The many is not 
synonymous with the multitude or the poor who threaten political oligarchies 
because of their sheer number (see Hardt and Negri, 2012). This is because I 
am less interested in the distinctive properties of the many (for example, their 
overpowering number or poverty that will incite transformation) and more in 
their indistinctiveness (that tallies with democratic processes of emptying). 
Along similar lines, the category of the many, at least in the way I intend to 
develop the term here, should not be conflated with the multiple 
constituencies – the ‘militant, cross-regional, pluralist assemblages’ –  that 
William Connolly associates with the politics of swarming in his more recent 
work (2017, p.144). Connolly’s account of such assemblages draws attention 
to their capacity to deliver transformation as they militantly disrupt corporate 
politics. By contrast, the many that I invoke in my reconstruction of radical 
democracy shows little evidence of such capacity. For as I intend to argue 
later in the section, it is the threat that its rule ingrains and poses to a given 
order that is laden with transformative potential, not the assemblying of the 
many per se (as Deleuzean influenced approaches to the multitude often 
propagate). For this reason, the many must also be distanced from the 
category of the majority prominent in epistemic arguments for democracy 
(Estlund 2008; Landemore 2012). As I approach it here, the many does not 
gesture toward decision-making. The category only mobilises the different, the 
excluded, the other – in other words, the currency of radical democracy – to 
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show that the transformation that such radical accounts promise is possible to 
construct in different terms. 
To support this reconstruction, it is useful to note how the focus on processes 
of subjectification, palpable in all radical theories, prefigures and lays down 
some markers of the category of the many. Subjectification designates the set 
of processes by which political subjects form out of the plural and excess 
materiality of socio-political relations (Rancière, 2011, p.15; Prentoulis and 
Thomassen, 2013; Woodford, 2017). Radical theories as diverse as those of 
Jacques Rancière, Hardt and Negri, Ernesto Laclau and Alain Badiou, to 
name a few, suffuse such processes with the potential to transform the 
institutions, identities and principles of determinate socio-political orders. 
While such theorists certainly disagree on how subjects subjectify and what 
this subjectification achieves (momentary disruption or a break with the 
existing socio-political order), they all converge in the idea that the political 
subjects which subjectifying processes constitute are key to triggering socio-
political transformation. Thus, it is safe to assume that there is an intimate 
connection between processes of subjectification, which politicise (and 
inevitably produce) the many, and transformation. This connection is an 
important first point to notice because it explains why the category of the 
many opens the way for an alternative account of rule, distinctive of radical 
theories. 
Jodi Dean’s recent work, Crowds and Party, is instructive in this respect. It 
suggests that the collective subject, which processes of subjectification give 
rise to - the crowd according to Dean - releases an egalitarian force that is 
capable of ‘rupturing’ the individual form on which neoliberalism thrives, 
thereby initiating transformation (Dean, 2016, pp.5, 215). The crowd, explains 
Dean, ‘is those proletarianised under capitalism’ (2016, pp.16-21): the 
disempowered, exploited, impoverished, and excluded from democratic 
structures who rise to challenge these not from the position of a set identity – 
say ethnically defined - but from their non-position or, perhaps more 
accurately, from the position of their non-identity. On this ground, Dean’s 
account of the crowd comes very close to Rancière’s ‘have-nots’, whose claim 
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to equality disrupts the police order (1999 and 2011, p.37); Badiou’s 
‘inexistent’ (2010, pp.9-10); and Laclau’s ‘plebs’ – the underdog in the making 
(2005).
This suggests that the non-identity of the many constitutes its second 
noteworthy attribute. Non-identity designates a ‘deprived existence’, that is, a 
certain hollowness of economic and political being that nonetheless 
constitutes in its hollowness some thin basis for collective identification. Non-
identity does not designate any set of fixed or normalised markers, as is the 
case with common usages of the term identity. It captures the web of 
deprivations that at once articulates and empties identity. Deprived existence 
encompasses references to lack and antagonism, that are central in Lacanian 
influenced accounts of radical theorising, while fostering a generality that is 
especially useful to the reconstruction of the radical democratic kinship that I 
undertake in this section. 
What is, more precisely, useful is that deprived existence leaves undecidable 
the question of whether the many politicise because they are impoverished 
politically – as Hardt and Negri for instance suggest with respect to 
representative democracy (2012); or economically - as Žižek (2010) argues 
when he prioritises economic antagonisms. Yet this is an important question 
to consider when the intention is to reconstruct the common ground among 
radical theories. Second, and closely related, deprived existence elicits 
politicisations that might not necessarily aim at reactivating democratic 
institutions – as Laclau anticipates (2005). It therefore leaves open nuanced 
questions about democracy and this openness is important for my discussion 
that intends to defend the signifier of democracy (in the next section). Third, 
deprived existence prefigures a certain claim to equality that none of the 
theories concerned with radical emancipatory projects will object to. Shortly, I 
will return to expand on this point. Here suffice to note that the deprived many 
offers the basis for a revised account of radical democracy. The remaining of 
the section probes the ways in which they pledge to rule.
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To grasp the intricacies of such a pledge, it is important to observe that the 
focus on ruling might rightly appear, at first impression, counter-intuitive. It 
gestures towards a relation that is difficult to tackle from the perspective of 
radical theories that agree on the need for openness but disagree on whether 
a transformative politics breaks with or improves the liberal democratic order. 
However, if we scratch beneath the rhetoric of transformation, that occupies a 
central role in treatments of radical theorising in the literature, it is possible to 
identify a distinctive reflection on the rule of the many – that can be used to 
strengthen the dialogue with democratic theory. At the heart of this reflection 
is the idea that the many can rule, even though they fail to do so. The reasons 
for this failure hinge on, without a doubt, the ontological presuppositions of 
individual theories and point toward either a necessary feature of the structure 
or to some temporary obstacle to socio-political actualisation. But this failed 
rule (if it must be seen as failed) does not in any way undermine the claim that 
all radical theories retain open the possibility of rule – especially if by rule we 
understand the process of leading or beginning to take command of politics.
This understanding draws on the polysemic nature of the verb to rule (kratein) 
and a nuanced distinction already implicit in the term democracy between 
governing (kybernein) and leading (archein).8 Whereas the former verb 
denotes steering and cannot be easily dissociated from that which is being 
steered – in this case, the representative institutions that the people steer or 
are steered by (depending on how one reads such processes); the second 
verb, archein, means, to lead – in the sense of both ‘heading’ and ‘going 
before’ - and instaurs, as a result, a more flexible relation with institutions. 
Institutions of representation might rupture as the theories of Hardt and Negri 
and Badiou propose, but they can also be taken over and controlled by the 
many as Dean’s, Laclau’s, and Žižek’s accounts of verticality propose. At the 
same time, the idea of archein (leading) tallies well with the practices of 
inclusivity and cooperation that radical political practices bring, as we have 
seen, to the fore. In sum, the underlying point here is this: if we follow the idea 
of archein (leading), already implicit in the verb to rule, then it is possible to 
tease out of all radical theories a reflection that calls attention not just to the 
failed nature of this rule, that I have already stressed; but also, crucially for the 
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next step of my argument, to its equal and promissory dimension - for the 
arche of the many both demands and promises equality. 
What is the nature of this equality? To avoid tying equality with a telos that no 
matter how desirable threatens a degree of closure, some radical theories 
suggest that equality arises as a demand at the level of the subjectifying 
process (Rancière, 1999; Laclau, 2005). Whether this demand is met (or not) 
is irrelevant and it can even be undone. At the same time, most (if not all) 
radical theories accentuate the inequalities which capitalism harbours and 
counterpoise these inequalities to the equality that the category of the many 
announces. Therefore, equality resides in this context in the many and it takes 
its concrete meaning from the antithesis with the unequal few (who look to 
their own benefit). It is also noteworthy that for a few theories equality 
constitutes the very horizon for the emancipatory process, both alleviating and 
disrupting the current antinomic order (Badiou, 2010; Dean, 2012; Žižek, 
2010). Following, then, the consequences of this line of thought, we can say 
that references to equality stage a promise. The promise is that the many can 
rule and, in so doing, initiate another order.
The promissory dimension of this order guarantees the open-endedness that 
one associates with radical theorising; but it does more than this. Understood 
as a possibility in the now, the promise projects equality – along with the 
notion of the many with which it is bound– into a tangible force that taps into, 
yet assuages, anxieties about growing inequality. It does not tether the 
possibility for equality with that of its actualisation. Therefore, it is not the 
same as the promise of eventualization9 that one finds in the Deleuzean-
influenced universe of becoming – most evident in Hardt and Negri’s work 
(2009 and 2012). It is also not synonymous with the promise of potentiality 
found in the Derridean repetition from an open-future (Derrida, 2006; Fritsch, 
2002) – as this takes the reconstruction of radical democracy back to the very 
ideas that I problematise in the first two sections. 
In a subtle departure from Derrida’s account of promissory politics as the 
affirmation of a radically open future (2006), the rendition of the promise that I 
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want to outline presses the categories of openness and potentiality further. It 
draws out its threatening and, effectively, destabilising dimension with the aim 
of accentuating the effects of promissory politics on unequal and exclusive 
orders. The upshot of this move is that the promissory politics of the many 
that I discuss here certainly frequents and haunts the present in line with 
Derrida’s account of the promise (2006, p.127). The nature of this haunting is 
however different. First, it is ontic - not a hauntology (Derrida, 2006, p.202) - 
because I want to posit the promise in the rule of the many. Second, it does 
not designate a ‘gap’, an otherness constitutive of being, as it does for Derrida 
(2006, p.81) but a genuinely threatening possibility. The promissory rule of the 
many has, as a result, a restraining effect that might be easy to fathom by 
bringing to mind the freezing reactions that usually arise in situations that 
inspire extreme fear. Fear, then, not messianic hope - for hospitality and 
another politics - is what lies behind the type of promise that I want to 
associate with the rule of the many.     
It follows from the above that my understanding of the promise lies in-between 
discussions of potentiality that insist that politics may happen (again 
differently) and discussions of actuality that suggest that politics will happen 
(differently). The first position, which finds its most elaborate expression in 
Laclau and Mouffe’s work, particularly their emphasis on re-activation through 
counter-hegemonic politics and a left populism, fails to register the limits of 
contemporary democracy when it comes to tackling socio-economic inequality 
(2001; Mouffe, 2018; Laclau, 2005). The second position, that is apparent in 
Bosteel’s writings among other work (2011a), fails to appreciate the strengths 
of contemporary democracy - particularly the threatening dimension of the 
principle of popular rule apropos of plutocratic politics. I will return to expand 
on this point in the next section. Here suffice to say that, in a subtle departure 
from both of the above positions, my account of the promise presses the idea 
that the many could rule - for it is this ‘could’ that plants egalitarian politics in 
the now as a real possibility; and frames this possibility both as a threatening 
and as a distinctively democratic one. 
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The democratic specificity of this possibility nonetheless raises one final 
crucial question: Why should the promissory rule of the many be tied to 
democracy? Terms such as ‘equality’, the ‘promise’, or the ‘many’ do not 
attach to any particular framework and can in principle affix to communism – 
much like the concept of the people, (as Laclau shows, 2005, p.167). To 
answer this question, that strikes at the heart of the intention to rethink and 
reassert the idea of a radical democracy, it is prudent that we take a small 
step back to reflect on the strengths of democracy – or, in other words, why 
democracy is still worth the candle as a signifier given the mounting animus 
against it. The next section is tasked with this reflection. 
3. The Democratic Promise
The previous section concluded by proposing that the promissory rule of the 
many be repositioned within a democratic framework. By a democratic 
framework, or simply by democracy, I understand the promise of popular rule 
– as I defined the promise in the last section. Of primary concern here is the 
name we give to this promise of rule and how this name affects and is, in turn, 
affected by the workings of institutional politics. Wendy Brown’s work, 
Undoing the Demos, helps us to grapple with this concern, because she 
draws a useful distinction between the conditions for democracy on the one 
hand, which institutions foster and neoliberal governmentality erodes; and the 
ideal of democracy on the other hand – that inspires social mobility, equality 
and a rich humanism (2015, pp.178-200). The word ‘inspire’ is key here, 
because Brown does not argue that the principle of popular rule secures true 
freedom and equality. She only argues that this allows for articulations of a 
variety of lofty principles (such as that of equality), which ensure that the 
pursuit of these principles remains possible for the majority of citizens of 
democratic regimes (2015, p.186). It is these articulations that social 
movements exploit to challenge stratified social orders (2015, p.206). And it is 
these same articulations that neoliberal governmentality threatens with the 
spread of economisation to every sphere of life according to Brown (2015, 
pp.17-18 and 209-210). 
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Coupled with the elimination of homo politicus, economisation contaminates 
the ‘lexical and semiotic register’ in which democracy operates and, in so 
doing, it undermines its ability to limit and critique ‘capitalist productions of 
value’ (2015, p.208). Democratic articulations come, as a result, under attack 
and the desire for democracy evaporates. The relevant point that Brown thus 
makes is that democracy, far from being the culprit in the rise of neoliberal 
governmentality, it is one of its casualties. Once the conditions congenial to 
the articulation of its ideals are hollowed out, democracy – and confidence in 
its transformative potential – is precisely what comes undone (Brown 2015, 
p.18). 
If we therefore follow Brown’s account of a democracy undone, we are in a 
better position to explain why the promissory rule of the many must be read 
as democratic. The first reason hinges on the valence of the adjective 
democratic. If Brown is right that the articulation of ideals such as that of 
equality (universal suffrage, social mobility etc.) is inseparable from 
democracy and its basic principle of popular rule, then it becomes apparent 
that abandoning democracy, in favour of some other idea such as 
communism, is counter-intuitive. There is already a normative force to 
democracy that other idea(l)s might find difficult to emulate (Olson in Bosteels 
and Olson, 2016, pp.127-8) and, even if they do, there is little guarantee that 
these will not be also subject to the same corrosive conditions that undo 
democracy (Kioupkiolis, 2014). 
The second reason, that lends support to a democratic reading of the 
promise, is closely related. It has to do with the fragility of democracy that 
Brown does a good job in bringing to our attention. If democracy is neither 
self-renewing nor self-sustaining, then those radical theories that propose to 
abandon it only buoy up the expectation that democracy will die out. To 
countervail it, it is more fruitful to seek to revive democracy by disrupting the 
conditions that jeopardise its survival. Radical theories that reject democracy 
in favour of communism, as we saw in the first section, will agree with this 
suggestion – given that they resuscitate the politics of the many while they 
find fault with the inequalities that institutional democracy harbours. Along 
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similar lines, activists and theorists engaged in the alternative tradition of 
radical democracy that Conway and Singh (2011) single out, do not altogether 
dismiss the signifier of democracy, they seek to redescribe it. If, thus, the 
problem is democracy in its institutional and neoliberal form (that Brown ties 
with the conditions for democracy), then another kind of democracy, where 
the many could rule, might still hold sufficient traction for radical theories to 
allow us to reposition the promissory rule of the many within the democratic 
frame. This brings me to the third reason that justifies why the promissory rule 
of the many must be attached to the democratic framework. 
Democracy hems in a radical principle. The radical principle in question is the 
presumption that the people should rule as Brown reminds us (2015, p.207).10 
When this presumption remains on the horizon it restricts the desire of elites 
to accrue more privileges (2015, pp.206-208). It functions, therefore, as a 
threat that hovers over and inevitably limits oligarchic tendencies. The 
promissory rule of the many envelops this threat as we have already seen.11 
In this sense, it constitutes a distinctively democratic resource because it is 
only within the frame of a democracy, that makes room for liberty inasmuch as 
for equality, that the promissory rule of the many transpires as a threat - as 
something that can, but does not always, happen. Of course, here it might be 
objected that theorists and activists concerned with radical practices will resist 
the scaling-up to the many that the idea of democracy ingrains. They might 
not resist, however, the threatening dimension of this category that draws 
attention to the need to displace hegemonic practices. Instead, therefore, of 
letting this democratic resource be high-jacked by conservative and anti-
democratic forces, it is vital that we reappraise and seek to revive it. Radical 
theories take an important step in this direction when they are reconstructed 
to align around the promissory politics of the many. In so doing, they bring 
important benefits to contemporary democratic thought – ones that the next 
section explores further. 
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4. Radical Democracy Reconstructed: Promissory Politics and 
Democratic Theory
So far I have canvased the promissory rule of the many, arguing that this 
could lay the basis for a reconstructed account of radical democracy. The task 
of this section is to explain why one should take the trouble to reconstruct the 
radical democratic account in the first place. 
A first answer to this question must be already apparent. Radicalisation 
through democracy or, in other words, a radical democracy, seems to have 
run out of steam in the context of gnawing doubts about the transformative 
potential of democracy in the context of neoliberal hegemony. Notice here that 
the problem that prompts my enquiry into radical democracy is not that radical 
theories disagree about the meaning or value of democracy. It is, rather, that 
they disagree about the continuing usefulness of democracy as a vector of 
transformation and that this is a serious enough disagreement to licence the 
need to re-examine, and not simply to defend, radical democracy. The 
literature has done a good job in defending the term against what Jonathan 
Dean (2015) aptly captures as the rise of a self-styled ‘authentically radical’ 
left emboldened by communism. But it has done little work in studying how 
and why the terms of the radical democratic kinship might change – to 
reassert the distinctive contribution of radical democrats within democratic 
thought. 
This reassertion, it is worth noting, comes with particular benefits for theorists 
and activists concerned with radical practices. If Conway and Singh (2011, 
p.703) are correct to suggest that the perspectives that saturate such 
practices do not yet form ‘a coherent theoretical project’, then it is perhaps 
relevant to begin to read the reconstruction of radical democracy that I offer 
here as an attempt to create such a theoretical project. This is, to my mind, 
necessary if one is to study the perspectives of such practices and the ways 
they influence the theories of radical democracy. It is also necessary in order 
to gather together and appreciate these practices as something more than 
local endeavours. 
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The second reason for reconstructing radical democracy is that there is still 
sufficient common ground in sight to allow this reconstruction. As previous 
sections showed, radical theories might fervently disagree about the need for 
democracy, institutional or otherwise, but they strongly converge in the idea 
that the deprived many – the excluded, exploited or disempowered – hold 
significant part in transformative politics. Understood as a non-identity, the 
many subjectify to reinscribe equality and transform the current order. No 
doubt, the nature of this transformation, which resides in the idea that the 
many can rule (archein), remains promissory. While the promise does little to 
assure that such rule is actualised or even deferred; it has a noteworthy effect 
nevertheless. It restricts anti-democratic forces and it limits oligarchic 
tendencies. Read, therefore, as possibility in the now, the promise conjoins a 
threat – that arises at a register other than institutions (namely, the threat of 
the many) – with a democracy that confines in institutions and is, by inference, 
affected by such threat. The purpose of this reading is that it makes it possible 
to reposition the promissory rule of the many within democracy without either 
underplaying the distrust of liberal hegemonies and institutions that one finds 
in radical theories or overplaying it by altogether abandoning the signifier of 
democracy. Its benefit is that it allows the setting up of a contrast with 
democratic theory - encumbered by the assumption that institutions (elections 
parliaments and laws) renew and, inevitably, transform the democratic 
process.  
Democratic theory has many voices and there are, to be sure, many ways to 
read these voices.12 But if we narrow down our investigation to the question of 
popular rule, probing the place that democratic theory gives to this principle, 
then we can begin to grapple with the difficulties that the term democratic 
theory presents. For there is, surprisingly, little talk of popular rule among 
democratic theorists. This hiatus, if it must be seen as such, helps to limit my 
query, but it does more than this. It lays the basis for the argument that radical 
democrats contribute to democratic theory precisely through their exploration, 
and as we have already seen, reworking of the principle of popular rule (as 
the promissory politics of the many). Therefore, the third reason for 
reconstructing radical democracy is that it strikes in a different direction from a 
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democratic theory that brackets the people on the assumption that, as 
citizens, they already rule in contemporary democracy. 
To say that democratic theorists assume that citizens already rule in a 
democracy is not a moot theoretical point. When we consider that the 
question lodged at the heart of such work is how the people rule - not whether 
they rule; it becomes apparent that this argument only makes explicit the self-
evident point that so long as citizens vote and engage in civil society they 
have ample opportunities to experience self-rule. If we take this point further, 
it also becomes apparent that radical democrats propose something else. 
Dissatisfied with the ways that contemporary democracies only tend to the 
wealthy few, they propose to bring the many back into politics not simply to 
extend democracy to ever new domains. The many, it must be recalled, could 
rule according to radical democrats – precisely because they do not rule. 
None of the standard theories, which the democratic canon divides into, will 
readily agree with this proposition. For example, pluralist theories concerned 
with the ways in which citizens influence and limit the democratic process 
focus on the competitions and contests that safeguard pluralist democracies 
(Dahl, 1971; Held, 2006). They do not ponder the ebb and flow of popular 
rule, because they assume that citizens find ways to channel their plural 
interests into the democratic process. 
Deliberative theories that are more attuned to questions of exclusion, apathy 
and empowerment look likewise mostly to institutionalised processes. They 
seek to expand and enhance the legitimating mechanisms of contemporary 
democracies, by developing procedural blueprints that boost citizen input into 
the governmental process (Fishkin,1991). They are not worried that the 
people do not rule because deliberative processes ensure that citizens have 
various fora at their disposal to form and express their preferences of the 
political process. Along similar lines, elitist theories focus on the institutional 
process and the ways in which the electorate authorises and controls the 
politicians who act on its behalf (Green, 2010; Held, 2006). The people neither 
exists for such theories nor can, for that matter, rule - only voters and 
spectators rule, if by rule we understand exerting some control over the 
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decision making process. In sum, the point of this stylised caricature is to 
show that democratic theory offers good grounds for the claim that citizens 
already rule in the democratic process. Whether these citizens are depicted 
as its voters or critics, they are the bedrock of democracy. The people are not 
and this is what I think is part of the problem.
Of course, the category of the people is not the same as the category of the 
many that I made the case for in the previous section. The many do not have 
the single will of the people even though they likewise arise in a subjectifying 
process. At the same time, the category of the many cannot be reduced to the 
citizens of liberal democracy. The many is a non-identity, a kind of deprived 
existence, one that is at odds with the positive identity of the citizens. 
Nevertheless, the many carries some of the legality that is distinctive of 
citizenship – or at least it does not rule out this legality as it finds expression in 
the rights of voting and protesting. And also, crucially for the next step in my 
argument, the category of the many carries the connotations of ordinariness 
and equality that attach to the category of the people – that should rule in 
democracy (Brown, 2015).
Democratic theorists, no doubt, suspect the people when this overlaps with 
the many. As David Held aptly explains, the rule of the many means on this 
line of thinking ‘the pursuit of unbridled desires and interests on the one hand, 
and ignorant short sighted views on the other’ (2006, p. 231). This leads some 
democratic theorists to negate the many (Green, 2010). It leads others to look 
to enlighten them.13 Their marginalisation, coupled with an unbridled 
confidence in institutions, leaves democratic theory with little resources to 
grapple with growing disaffect for democracy. Grounded on a deep seated 
mistrust of a democracy that fails to deliver for the many, popular disaffect 
finds expression in elections where candidates styled as anti-establishment 
emerge triumphant; in referenda that foreground the end of politics as usual; 
and in various protests. It ensnares a dissatisfaction with the institutional 
process that is difficult to overlook (Sitrin and Azzellini, 2014). Empirical 
studies lend support to such dissatisfaction. Gilens and Page (2014) 
demonstrate, for example, that decision makers rarely take heed of popular 
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preferences, promoting most of the time policies that are supported by 
corporations and the wealthy.
If we take such evidence seriously then we are in better position to 
understand why democratic theory fails to fathom mounting disaffect for 
institutional democracy: it undermines the degree to which institutions 
consolidate unequal democracy. This is not to say that democratic theorists 
do not worry about political crises or limits inherent to the institutional process, 
only that they are less convincing when they propose that disaffect springs 
from disempowerment that has roots in poor institutional performance (Della 
Porta, 2013). Poor institutional performance might threaten the kind of 
empowerment that democratic theorists propose will relieve institutional 
mistrust, but aspirations for empowerment are not the same as the aspirations 
for equality that seem to fuel this mistrust – especially if we tie equality with 
the emancipatory politics of the many. In sum, the point I want to make here is 
that without attention to the many it is difficult to understand the politics of 
rejection and the mounting disaffect that such politics harbours. Radical 
democrats can help us to grapple with this disaffect for they tap into the very 
unease about the way that institutional democracy relates to the many.  
One final, crucial, question remains however: Does the promissory rule of the 
many, which serves as the basis for my reconstruction of radical democracy, 
bracket the hard question of institutions that a genuine rethinking of radical 
democracy should involve? After all, it can be argued that an effort to 
construct radical democratic institutions is what might more effectively 
strengthen the dialogue with democratic theory. No doubt, democratic 
theorists (and here I include radical democrats) will see some truth to this 
argument but at the cost of overlooking the distinctiveness of radical 
democratic voices – a distinctiveness that lies, as we have seen, in the 
emphasis that radical democrats place on processes of emptying through 
practices that ensure openness and participation. If this distinctiveness is 
seen as a resource for contemporary democratic theorists, as I have argued 
throughout this section, then aspirations to create radical democratic 
institutions transpire as misplaced. They bend radical accounts of democracy 
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to the vernacular of democratic theory when it might be more fruitful for 
political life to awaken democratic theorists to the distinctiveness of radical 
democracy. This distinctiveness, that the present paper pushes further with 
the idea of the promissory rule of the many, keeps alive the critical attention to 
institutional democracy without confining democracy to liberal institutions, 
which we saw theorists and activists expressing concern over at the start of 
the article. It also keeps alive the need to develop ideational insights into 
democracy that are significant for those who struggle for another, more 
egalitarian, democracy. In other words, it keeps alive the need for a 
promissory politics that assures that the promise that the many will rule 
becomes less important than the threat that they can rule.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to put radical democracy under critical 
scrutiny. Trading on the intuition that the doubts on the transformative 
potential of democracy  – the common article of faith among radical 
democrats – are threatening to undermine it as a debate in democratic 
thought; this paper set out to reconstruct it around some other common 
denominator. While this reconstruction did not yield a new model of radical 
democracy (it did not aim to), it recast its contribution to democratic theory, by 
bringing into sharp relief the promissory rule of the many. Without the promise 
of the many or, in other words, without the promise of a democratic 
radicalism, Wendy Brown is right that democracy comes to be undone. 
Democratic theorists should be no less troubled by this possibility than radical 
democrats already are. 
Endnotes
1
 For example, Tønder and Thomassen explain how the critical emphasis that 
radical democrats place on openness issues from the ontological claim that a 
‘radical difference’ will always dissect and subvert orders that are considered 
to be fixed, consensual or universal (2005, p.1). If a ‘radical difference’ is 
constitutive of socio-political being, then no relation of exclusion remains 
unquestioned for long. It becomes the subject of contestation, revision and 
reform. This ethos of contestation is what some theorists take to be the 
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defining marker of radical democracy (Howarth, 2008; Glynos, 2003). Radical 
democracy usually melds with agonism on this line of thought. 
2
 Aletta Norval, for example, distinguishes between a post-structuralist and a 
critical theory strand of radical democracy and she suggests that, while they 
disagree on how to radicalise democracy (consensually or agonistically), they 
strongly agree on the need to expand the domains in which democratic 
participation may be exercised (Norval, 2001). 
3
 This is not surprising. For the post-1968 left it made little sense to question 
whether the extension and deepening of a participatory democracy would 
make a difference to society. If such questions were raised at all, they were 
tied to particular ontologies whose differences were in turn used to explain the 
ensuing disagreements on the type of democracy that was radicalized. 
4
 Boaventura de Souza Santos uses the term ‘epistemologies of the South‘ to 
capture ‘the perspective of those who have systematically suffered the 
dominations caused by colonialism and capitalism’ (2016, p.18). While Walter 
Mignolo stresses, in a step further, the need to develop ‘border thinking’ 
epistemologies that rooted in subaltern practices offer alternative accounts 
that displace hegemonic significations (2000, p.742).
5
 See Jonathan Dean, 2015. 
6
 While Hardt and Negri (2009) stress the productive dimension of immaterial 
labour; Žižek
 (2011) and Dean (2016) expound a capitalist order that is only subjecting and 
totalising. 
7
 For example, Alain Badiou (2013), Ernesto Laclau (2005) and Jodi Dean 
(2016) all use the term people. However, Badiou distinguishes the inexistent 
from the citizens of state democracy (2012); Dean distinguishes it from the 
crowd (2016); and Laclau (2005) ties its rise with the dynamics of 
representation that Badiou takes issue with. To make matters more 
complicated, Hardt and Negri (2009) speak of the multitude or more recently 
the commoners (2012); and Žižek usually uses the term ‘excluded’ (2010 & 
2011) or he follows Jacques Rancière’s account of the have-nots (1999). It 
can thus be readily seen that the category of the many, which cuts across this 
variation, can have a productive bearing on the analysis of the commonalities 
among radical theories – in a way that the concept of the people, which it 
comes close to, does not. 
8
 For an explanation of archein see Ober, 2008. My account differs from his in 
that archein is already implicit in (and not opposed to) kratein. 
9
 Here I assume that for Deleuzean influenced theorists eventualization and 
actualisation go hand-in-hand. But one cannot fail to notice, in this context, 
that references to actualisation also permeate the promise of eventuality that 
one finds in the work of Badiou (2012) and Bosteels (2011a).
10
 A clarification is due at this point. Whereas Brown proposes that the people 
should rule, I propose that for theories that are concerned with radical 
emancipatory projects the many could rule. Even though Brown does not 
explicitly confront this second possibility, she circles around it when she 
dissects the elimination of homo politicus. At the same time, it is worth noting 
that while Brown speaks of the ‘bare promise of bare democracy’ – by which 
she understands the idea that the people should rule (2015, p.203) – she 
does not see this promise either as radical or threatening, which is how I 
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effectively approach these to explain why the promissory rule of the many 
must be seen as democratic. 
11
 It is important to stress that from my perspective the threat attaches to the 
promise – not to the presumption of popular rule that Brown speaks about.
12
 For example, Urbinati and Warren (2008) distinguish between theories that 
work within standard accounts of representative democracy and those that 
focus on participation. David Held (2006) distinguishes between elitist, 
pluralist and deliberative theories of democracy. 
13
 See Urbinati’s critique of deliberative democracy as one form of 
epistemocracy (2014, pp.81-127).
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